BLACK CITIZENSHIP, DEHUMANIZATION, AND THE
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT
Reginald Oh ∗
The fight for full Black citizenship has been in large measure a fight
against the systematic dehumanization of African Americans.
Dehumanization is the process of treating people as less than human, as
subhuman. Denying Blacks full and equal citizenship has gone hand in
hand with denying their full humanity. To effectively promote equal
citizenship for African Americans, therefore, requires an explicit
commitment to ending their dehumanization.
In this Essay, Part I will discuss the concept of dehumanization and
its role in the infliction of harm on a dehumanized class of people. Part II
will discuss the concept of citizenship, and contend that full and equal
citizenship consists of four layers of citizenship: formal, political, civil,
and social citizenship. While the first three types of citizenship are
familiar, social citizenship is a neglected yet crucial aspect of full
citizenship. Social citizenship entails the right and ability to enter into and
have personal relationships based on mutual respect and equality with
other members or citizens of the political community.
Part III will examine three key race and citizenship cases to illustrate
how dehumanization has been pivotal in denying full citizenship or
imposing second-class citizenship on Blacks, especially in denying
Blacks social citizenship. In Dred Scott v. Sandford, the Supreme Court
dehumanized Blacks to deny them formal U.S. citizenship. 1 In Plessy v.
Ferguson, the Court dehumanized Blacks in upholding racial segregation
and denying them social citizenship. 2 In Naim v. Naim, the Virginia
Supreme Court dehumanized racial minorities in upholding a ban on
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interracial marriage, contending that interracial marriages would
undermine good citizenship. 3
Part IV will conclude by exploring the implications of my analysis
for Black citizenship in the twenty-first century. It’s only when
dehumanization is squarely addressed and eliminated that full and equal
citizenship status can realistically be attained. A constitutional doctrine of
equal citizenship, then, must address and eliminate practices and policies
which systematically dehumanize African Americans, such as racial
segregation in education or racist policing.
I. DEHUMANIZATION
Dehumanization is the process by which people are understood to be
less than human. 4 A group or class of people is dehumanized through
language or imagery depicting them as animalistic or subhuman.
Dehumanization encompasses two layers. One layer involves stripping a
person, or class of persons, of human qualities, such as emotions and
cognitive abilities. 5 The second layer involves “attributing demonic or
bestial qualities to them.” 6 The two layers combine to turn a dehumanized
person into something less than human, something even akin to a
subhuman, animalistic creature. 7
For social psychologist Albert Bandura, “[t]he process of
dehumanization is an essential ingredient in the perpetration of
inhumanities.” 8 Dehumanization plays a paramount role in the
marginalization of certain groups, as “conceiving of people as subhuman
often makes them objects of violence and victims of degradation.” 9
How does dehumanization lead people to inflict harm or support
punitive policies against a class of people? One factor is the attitudes of
the person or group engaging in dehumanization. When a group views a
specific class of people as subhuman, these outgroups are placed “outside
of normal moral consideration,” which then “facilitate[s] violence against
the dehumanized group.” 10 According to Herbert Kelman, “[t]o the extent
3.
4.
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victims are dehumanized, principles of morality no longer apply to them
and moral restraints are more readily overcome.” 11 The ability to restrain
oneself from engaging in cruel conduct against another person is severely
diminished once the victim is stripped of human qualities. 12
Dehumanizing a group also elicits negative emotions, such as anger,
disgust, and fear against the dehumanized group. 13 Those negative
emotions can lead to reduced empathy for the dehumanized group and
support the desire for harsh, punitive treatment.
Historically, dehumanization was integral to the atrocities inflicted
upon marginalized classes in society. For example, dehumanization
played a crucial part in the genocidal campaign against Jews during World
War II, and in the enslavement of persons of African descent in the United
States.
In Nazi Germany, those who were Jewish were dehumanized as an
insidious, subhuman race of people who possessed the qualities of disease
and vermin. 14 Adolf Hitler believed Jewish people were an “illness
spreading parasite, representing the danger of disease.” 15 He considered
them as a “germ, germ carrier, or agent of disease, a decomposing agent,
fungus, or maggot.” 16 He referred to Jews as “bloodsuckers, leeches, and
poisonous parasites.” 17 Joseph Goebbels, in a Nazi propaganda film he
produced entitled The Eternal Jew, connected “Jews and filth, decay, and
disease in every sector of cultural life. The film’s narrator gravely states
the ‘race of parasites’ has no feeling for the ‘purity and cleanliness’ of the
German idea of art.” 18 A campaign of genocide seemed entirely rational,
logical, and necessary to the Nazis once Jews were dehumanized as
vermin and disease.
Similarly, dehumanization was at the heart of African and African
American experiences with slavery and segregation in the United States.19
American slaveholders justified the enslavement of Africans by
contending that they were animalistic subhumans. 20 If Africans were not
11. H.C. Kelman, Violence Without Moral Restraint: Reflections on the Dehumanization of
Victims and Victimizers, 29 J. SOC. ISSUES 24, 48 (1973).
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13. See Stephen M. Utych, How Dehumanization Influences Attitudes Towards Immigrants, 1
POL. RES. Q. 19 (2017).
14. SMITH, supra note 4, at 146.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id.
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19. See id. at 114–23 (describing dehumanization of Africans).
20. Id. at 117 (“Many colonists treated slaves as less than human and also explicitly stated that
Africans were soulless animals.”).
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really human, then enslaving them did not constitute a violation of human
rights. Thus, slavery apologists believed that Africans could be “tamed,
trained and used like domestic animals. . . .” 21
Even after the abolishment of slavery, African Americans continued
to be dehumanized. Immediately after slavery was abolished, former slave
states enacted the Black Codes, state laws constructing a system of
discriminatory treatment depriving African Americans of basic liberties.22
After the Fourteenth Amendment abolished the Black Codes, former slave
states implemented Jim Crow segregation. 23 Like slavery, Jim Crow
segregation was a manifestation of the entrenched belief that African
Americans were racially inferior subhumans and who could not share
spaces as equals with whites. 24
The tragic story of Ota Benga, a member of the African pygmy group
from central Africa, illustrates the horrors of dehumanization. In the early
twentieth century, a white American arranged for Ota Benga to move from
Africa to the United States to become an attraction at the Bronx Zoo in
New York. 25 Ota Benga was put in a cage as if he was an animal. In fact,
they made him share his cage with an orangutan.26 The New York Times
reported on Ota Benga, stating, “‘[f]ew expressed audible objection to the
sight of a human being in a cage with monkeys as companions.’” 27
The treatment of Ota Benga created an uproar among the local
African American community. Under intense social pressure, the Bronx
Zoo ultimately released Ota Benga from his cage. However, he remained
at the zoo and continued to be treated as an attraction. Thousands of
visitors came to see “the star attraction in the park, the wild man from
Africa. They chased him about the grounds all day, howling, jeering, and
yelling” before Ota Benga ultimately committed suicide. 28
Note that dehumanization is not the same as racism, bigotry, or
prejudice. Dehumanization is not just antipathy, discrimination, or hatred.
One can hate a person or a race of people without denying that person’s
or race’s full humanity. Rather, “[d]ehumanization is racism on
21.
22.
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steroids.” 29 The worst atrocities that we associate with racism are actually
the result of racism intertwined with dehumanization.
II. CITIZENSHIP
While seemingly simple and straightforward, citizenship is a difficult
concept to pin down. Citizenship is “not a unitary concept” and is
therefore subject to multiple meanings. 30 I posit a conceptual framework
that includes four types of citizenship.
The first concept is formal citizenship or citizenship as legal status. 31
This type of citizenship “refers to formal or nominal membership in an
organized political community.” 32 Formal citizenship is the typical
understanding of citizenship, and it entails meeting the legal criteria for
being a citizen. In the United States, formal U.S. citizenship is obtained
by meeting the constitutional requirement set forth in Section 1 of the
Fourteenth Amendment or by meeting the statutory requirements to
become a naturalized citizen.
If by citizenship all we mean is formal citizenship, there would not
be much complexity in defining who or who is not a full citizen of the
United States, and the notion of second-class citizenship would have little
salience. Complexity exists because there are multiple conceptions of
citizenship.
In addition to formal citizenship, I suggest that there are three other
types of citizenship: political, civil, and social citizenship. Borrowing
from a conceptual framework of equality from the late nineteenth and
early twentieth century, I view these kinds of citizenship as substantive in
nature. 33
Political citizenship is about democratic self-governance and
participation. Being a political citizen means having the right to equally
and fully participate in aspects of democratic self-governance. It includes
the right to vote, the right to serve on juries, and the right to serve in
political office. 34 Political citizenship entails the rights and duties
associated with the political community.
29. DAVID LIVINGSTONE SMITH, ON INHUMANITY: DEHUMANIZATION AND HOW TO RESIST
IT 52 (2020).
30. Jennifer Gordon & R.A. Lenhardt, Citizenship Talk: Bridging the Gap Between
Immigration and Race Perspectives, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 2493, 2500 (2007).
31. Linda Bosniak, Citizenship Denationalized, 7 IND. J. GLOBAL L. STUDIES 447, 456 (2000).
32. Id. at 456.
33. See Reva Siegel, Why Equal Protection No Longer Protects: The Evolving Forms of StatusEnforcing State Action, 49 STAN. L. REV. 1111, 1120 (1997).
34. See Jack Balkin, Plessy, Brown, and Grutter: A Play in Three Acts, 26 CARDOZO L. REV.
1689, 1694 (2005).

162

CONLAWNOW

[12:157

Civil citizenship is about participation in civil society. 35 Civil
citizenship includes “equal rights to make contracts, own, lease, and
convey property, sue and be sued, and according to some formulas, the
right of freedom of speech and free exercise of religion.” 36
Social citizenship is the most ambiguous and under-theorized type of
citizenship, yet the concept of social citizenship is crucial to
understanding what full citizenship means as it pertains to African
Americans. I define social citizenship in terms of both rights and
recognition. It involves the right to enter into and have personal
relationships with other citizens, and it involves the recognition as an
equal within these relationships. Relationships that implicate social
citizenship include equal relationships among colleagues, friends,
neighbors, classmates, relatives, and spouses. Social citizenship entails
the rights and duties associated with what I call interpersonal society.
Leading African American political thinkers in the first half of the
twentieth century such as W.E.B. Dubois strongly believed that full social
citizenship was central to full Black citizenship. He contended that Blacks
must gain, in addition to civil and political citizenship, social equality or
citizenship in order to be truly free. 37 Dubois defined the term “social” in
social equality or citizenship to mean “[n]ot only . . . the intimate contacts
of the family group and of personal companions, but also and increasingly
. . . the whole vast complex of human relationships through which we
carry out our cultural patterns.” 38 With regards to personal intimate
contacts “like marriage, intimate friendships and sociable gatherings,
equality means the right to select one’s own mates and close
companions.” 39 The quintessential right associated with social citizenship
is the right to marry. Historically, Blacks were denied social citizenship
by being denied the right to intermarry whites.
With the three kinds of citizenship in mind, we can then theorize
about what it means to be a second-class citizen. I suggest that, when we
talk about a second-class citizen, we refer to a person who possesses
formal citizenship, but who lacks or is denied one or more of the three
other kinds of citizenship. In the context of the United States race
relations, second-class citizenship for African Americans postReconstruction Amendments has meant, in large part, the denial of full
social citizenship. The primary basis for that denial has been rooted in
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
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dehumanization, and that denial has resulted in systematic racial
segregation in all aspects of interpersonal society for African Americans.
III. THE CASES ON RACE AND CITIZENSHIP
This Section will discuss three cases on race and citizenship, and
examine how, in each case, the court either denied formal citizenship
entirely to, or imposed second-class citizenship status on, African
Americans and other racial minorities. In each of the cases, the overt
dehumanization of African Americans was at the heart and center of the
courts’ reasoning.
A.

Dred Scott v. Sandford

The dehumanization of African Americans was the central theme in
the infamous 1857 Supreme Court decision denying U.S. citizenship to
descendants of African slaves in the United States, Dred Scott v.
Sandford. 40 In Dred Scott, the Court held that, a slave and all descendants
of slaves were categorically prohibited from being U.S. citizens, even if
they were born on U.S. soil, even if they were themselves never a slave.
As a result, the plaintiff, a slave seeking emancipation, could not bring a
lawsuit in federal court on the basis of diversity of citizenship jurisdiction.
In short, Dred Scott rendered all descendants of slaves in the United States
stateless non-citizens for all perpetuity.
The key rationale was based on Chief Justice Taney’s understanding
of the framer’s original intent regarding the status of African slaves. The
key question was whether the framers, in constructing the Constitution
and notions of U.S. citizenship, meant to include slaves or the descendants
of slaves as part of the American political community and thereby entitled
to citizenship. 41 His answer was an emphatic no:
In the opinion of the court, the legislation and histories of the times, and
the language used in the Declaration of Independence, show, that neither
the class of persons who had been imported as slaves, nor their
descendants, whether they had become free or not, were then
acknowledged as a part of the people, nor intended to be included in the
general words used in that memorable instrument. 42

For Taney, the reason why the framers excluded Africans from the
American political community was because they explicitly and openly
40.
41.
42.
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Id. at 407.
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viewed African slaves as nothing more than “ordinary articles of
merchandise.” 43 In other words, because the framers believed Africans
were less than human, non-human, they were nothing more than objects
to be owned and sold. As “ordinary articles of merchandise,” Taney
argued that the framers thought of Africans “as beings of an inferior order,
and altogether unfit to associate with the white race, either in social or
political relations. . . .” 44 They believed that Africans were so inferior that
they could and should “justly and lawfully be reduced to slavery for his
benefit.” 45
For Taney, excluding persons of African descent from the American
political community was justified, not necessarily because he himself
believed that African Americans were objectively inferior, but, because
he believed that the framers thought that Africans were inferior and less
than human. In other words, even if Taney thought, as an objective matter,
Africans were not inferior by nature, as long as the framers viewed and
treated them as inferior, i.e., as long as the framers dehumanized them,
then that was a sufficient basis to deny Africans U.S. citizenship.
Essentially, Taney honored and bestowed respect upon the framers’
dehumanization of African slaves instead of condemning it.
Although Taney did not use the word dehumanization to describe
how the framers viewed and treated African slaves and their descendants,
that is the word which best fits their view. Taney noted that the framers
“stigmatized” (dehumanized) Africans as an inferior, subordinate class of
people unfit to be U.S. citizens. 46
In another part of his opinion, Taney argued that the existence of
anti-miscegenation laws in the colonies and states in the eighteenth
century was further proof that the framers universally viewed persons of
African descent as less than human and unfit to be U.S. citizens.47 Taney
referred to anti-miscegenation laws in non-slave colonies and states to
show that even those who opposed slavery still believed in the inferior,
subhuman nature of Africans who were unfit to marry whites, and
consequently, unfit to be U.S. citizens. 48
The Court referred to a 1705 Massachusetts anti-miscegenation law
as proof that the colonies and the eventual states thought of Africans as a
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“degraded” and “unhappy” subordinate race.49 For the Court, the fact that
free states enacted anti-miscegenation laws is convincing proof that a
“perpetual and impassable barrier was intended to be erected between the
white race and the one which they had reduced to slavery, and governed
as subjects with absolute and despotic power. . . .” 50 The framers “looked
upon” Africans “as so far below them in the scale of created beings, that
intermarriages between white persons and negroes and mulattoes were
regarded as unnatural and immoral. . . .” 51 These anti-miscegenation laws
banned all marriages between whites and persons of African descent,
whether free or a slave, showing that the “stigma” of subordinate, inferior
status “was fixed upon the whole race,” not just among slaves. 52
Taney’s logic is straightforward: If Africans were so degraded and
inferior to whites that the framers prohibited and criminalized their
marriage to whites, why would the framers grant formal citizenship to
such a degraded and inferior class of people? 53 In other words, the fact
that the framers denied Blacks a key right associated with social
citizenship, the right to marry, was conclusive proof for Taney that they
meant to deny them formal citizenship in perpetuity. And dehumanization
was central to denying Blacks the right to marry whites.
B.

Plessy v. Ferguson

In 1868, through the Citizenship Clause, the Fourteenth Amendment
effectively overruled Dred Scott and ensured U.S. citizenship to African
Americans born in the United States. However, while African Americans
obtained formal citizenship, they were quickly relegated to being secondclass citizens, first through Black Codes, then through systematic, state
sanctioned racial segregation.
Decided in 1896, the Court in Plessy v. Ferguson upheld the
constitutionality of racial segregation in public places and spaces. 54 At
issue was a Louisiana law requiring the separation of the races on
passenger trains. 55 The plaintiff challenged the law as a violation of equal
protection. The Court held that there was no equal protection violation,
even though the statute facially discriminated on the basis of race.

49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
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Id. at 409.
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In upholding racial segregation, the Court had to somehow conclude
that it did not offend the guarantees of citizenship, equality, and liberty to
African Americans under the Fourteenth Amendment. If Blacks could not
be excluded from a jury as the Court held in West Virginia v. Strauder 56 a
few decades before Plessy, how could the Court then conclude that Blacks
could be excluded from public spaces and places on the basis of their race?
The Court relied on the distinction between political, civil, and social
equality (citizenship) to do so. While acknowledging that the purpose of
the Equal Protection Clause was to “enforce the absolute equality of the
two races before the law,” the Court emphasized that it was not intended
to “enforce social, as distinguished from political, equality, or a
commingling of the two races upon terms unsatisfactory to each other.” 57
In other words, the Court reasoned that the Fourteenth Amendment
guaranteed African Americans the rights associated with civil and
political citizenship, but it did not provide them the rights associated with
social citizenship. Why not? The Court, like the Dred Scott Court, resorted
to dehumanizing African Americans to deny them social citizenship. It
relied on its belief in the inherent inferiority of African Americans to
conclude that they had no right to associate with whites in social spaces
as their equals: “If the civil and political rights of both races be equal, one
cannot be inferior to the other civilly or politically. If one race be inferior
to the other socially, the constitution of the United States cannot put them
on the same plane.” 58
The Plessy decision paved the way for the systematic segregation
and subordination of Blacks in Jim Crow South, segregation that imposed
on Blacks second-class citizenship status. While Blacks were also denied
political rights during Jim Crow, the central feature of Jim Crow was the
dehumanizing treatment of Blacks as social inferiors unfit to associate
with whites as equals.
Thus, for the Plessy Court, while the Fourteenth Amendment
provided African Americans the rights associated with civil and political
citizenship, it did not require Blacks to be treated as fully human and
thereby entitled to the rights associated with social citizenship. Restricting
social citizenship was a way to deny as many of the aspects of citizenship
as possible to African Americans while conceding those aspects it could
not find a way to deny as a constitutional matter.

56.
57.
58.

103 U.S. 303 (1880).
Id. at 544.
Id. at 551–52.
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Plessy ensured official second-class citizenship status for African
Americans for the first half of the twentieth century until the Court’s
decision in Brown v. Board of Education in 1954, when the Court struck
down racial segregation of public schools. 59
C.

Naim v. Naim

In the aftermath of Brown, one of the central questions of racial
equality left was the constitutionality of laws banning interracial marriage.
In Naim v. Naim, 60 the Virginia Supreme Court in 1955 upheld the Racial
Integrity Act, the state’s anti-miscegenation statute. It did so by
dehumanizing people of color, in particular, mixed-race people of color,
and contending that the state was justified in banning interracial marriages
because they threatened and undermined good citizenship.
In Naim, a white wife of a Chinese husband sought to annul their
marriage. The couple were residents of Virginia who had gone to North
Carolina to get married and then returned to Virginia to live together as
husband and wife. 61 The trial court issued a decree declaring the marriage
void because it was an interracial marriage in violation of Virginia’s ban
of interracial marriages. On appeal, the Virginia Supreme Court upheld
the constitutionality of the statute under the Fourteenth Amendment Equal
Protection and Due Process Clauses. 62
The court’s analysis focused on two themes. The first theme was the
traditional authority of states to regulate marriage as part of their police
power: “The right, in the states, to regulate and control, to guard, protect,
and preserve this God-given, civilizing, and Christianizing institution is
of inestimable importance, and cannot be surrendered, nor can the states
suffer or permit any interference with.” 63
The second theme was citizenship. The court reasoned that the state
had a legitimate interest in prohibiting interracial marriages in order to
promote good citizenship. Interracial marriage could be prohibited
because “no sort of valid reasoning could it be found to be a foundation
of good citizenship. . . .” 64 Going even further, the court reasoned that it
believed interracial marriages are actually “harmful to good
citizenship.” 65
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
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Id. at 81.
Id. at 89–90.
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It may not seem intuitively clear what marriage has to do with good
citizenship, let alone interracial marriage. It is only when we consider the
court’s explicit dehumanization of racial minorities that the connection
starts to make sense, at least from the perspective of segregationists.
One reason that the court used the theme of citizenship to uphold the
ban on interracial marriage is due to the U.S. Supreme Court’s seminal
decision, Brown v. Board of Education, handed down in 1954. 66 In that
case, the Court struck down racial segregation in public schools as a
violation of equal protection. The Naim decision followed one year later,
and the central question was, could bans on interracial marriage survive
Brown?
The Naim court addressed Brown head on and distinguished it. The
court seized on the language in Brown about good citizenship. 67 The
Brown Court reasoned that, because a sound education is so important to
good citizenship, it must be provided on an equal basis. 68 For the Naim
court the central holding of Brown was that racial segregation was
detrimental to good citizenship, while racial integration was necessary to
ensure that Black children grew up to be good citizens. The Naim court
then argued that Brown supports the ban on interracial marriages, because
interracial marriages actually undermine good citizenship.
For the Naim court, how exactly did interracial marriages
undermined good citizenship? The key to understanding the Naim court’s
rationale is the notion of racial purity or integrity, and the fear of mixedrace children. For the Naim court, it was a patently legitimate state interest
to “preserve the racial integrity of its citizens.” 69 What did that mean?
Preserving racial integrity, specifically, preserving white racial integrity,
meant ensuring that whites remained whites over time. That required the
state to prevent the “corruption of blood,” which was a metaphor both for
sex between a white and non-white person, and the results of such sexual
intercourse: the production of a child with corrupted blood; i.e., a child
with superior white blood “mixed” with inferior non-white blood.
The corruption of blood, if it were allowed to occur, would “weaken
or destroy the quality of its citizens,” resulting in a “mongrel breed of
citizens.” 70 And, for the Naim court, the proliferation of mongrel citizens
would spell disaster for Virginia and its goal of promoting good
citizenship.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.

347 U.S. 483 (1954).
Id. at 493.
Id.
Naim, 197 Va. at 90.
Id.
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Mongrel citizens, or mixed-race persons, were a danger to “good
citizenship” because the court and segregationists believed that mixed
race people were a race of people degraded and inferior to pure whites. If
interracial marriages were permitted or encouraged, they would lead to
the production of “mongrel” children. Over time, as more and more whites
and non-whites entered into interracial marriages, mongrels would soon
become the majority or dominant racial group. And a state or even nation
dominated by inferior, inept, and incompetent mongrel citizens is a state
or nation that would be in perpetual decline.
The belief that mongrel citizens would harm or destroy good
citizenship was based on the dehumanization of Blacks and mixed-race
people as inferior, less than human creatures compared to pure white
citizens. Dehumanization was central to denying non-whites the right to
marry, a right central to social citizenship. And in denying Blacks full
social citizenship, the state of Virginia and other segregationist states were
continuing to impose second-class citizenship status on Blacks and other
racial minorities.
The Supreme Court finally ruled that bans on interracial marriages
violate the Fourteenth Amendment in Loving v. Virginia. 71 We can and
should understand Loving to be a case about race and citizenship, not just
about race and interpersonal relationships. It stands for the proposition
that the right to marry anyone of one’s choice is an integral right of social
citizenship specifically, and a right of full citizenship more broadly. In
rejecting Virginia’s interest in preventing the production of “mongrel
citizens,” the Loving Court emphatically rejected racial dehumanization
as a means of imposing second-class citizenship on people of color. 72
IV. CONCLUSION: BLACK CITIZENSHIP IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY
What are some of the lessons that we can draw from my analysis for
what full citizenship for African Americans might mean today?
One key lesson is that dehumanization has been a central feature of
the subordination and denial of full citizenship to African Americans
throughout American history. Slavery was dehumanization. Jim Crow
segregation was dehumanization. The ban on interracial marriage was
dehumanization. To state that African Americans have experienced racial
discrimination over the centuries, without explicitly linking
dehumanization to that discrimination, fails to highlight how truly

71.
72.

388 U.S. 1 (1967).
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pernicious and insidious that discrimination was. Dehumanization went
hand in hand with differential treatment.
A second lesson is that dehumanization, throughout American
history, from Dred Scott to Naim, has been considered a valid justification
for racial discrimination and subordination. Instead of being condemned
as morally wrong, the defenders of white supremacy believed that the
dehumanization of African Americans was completely unproblematic and
justifiable. While one may understand how in 1857, the Supreme Court
could honor and respect how the framers dehumanized Blacks, it may
seem incredible that even in 1967, states like Virginia openly and
unabashedly dehumanized Blacks and mixed-race persons. The
normalization of dehumanization in American history must be
acknowledged and understood if we are to fully grapple with the legacy
of systemic racism in America.
A third and perhaps most sobering lesson is that dehumanization is
still a central part of the racial discrimination that African Americans and
other racial groups experience today. When we look for it, we can see
dehumanization virtually everywhere. De facto racial segregation in
public schools and housing; the continuing stigma associated with
interracial marriages between whites and Blacks; the experience with
racist policing; the mass incarceration of Blacks and Latinos; these are all
the elements of continuing second-class citizenship and systematic
dehumanization of Blacks. Given that dehumanization has been
normalized throughout American history, it really should not be surprising
that racial dehumanization is still pervasive in America. Dehumanization
is an integral aspect of current systemic racism.
Finally, the hopeful lesson is that dehumanization does not have to
be inevitable. Dehumanization can be countered through rehumanization.
Rehumanization means treating dehumanized people with respect and
dignity. In practice, that means actively entering into and maintaining
relationships with persons of all races that involve mutual respect.
Racial diversity and inclusion programs are fundamentally about
racial rehumanization. They are about the inclusion of Blacks in various
arenas of civil, political, and interpersonal society out of the belief that
they are social equals deserving of mutual respect and equality. The
diversity and inclusion movement seeks to encourage and facilitate
recognition of diverse racial identities. To that end, we can think of
diversity as fundamentally about granting full citizenship for African
Americans.

